Bell 206 L1 Crashes Offshore

 On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, the commercial pilot sustained serious injuries and two other passengers received minor injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana.

The flight originated from offshore platform Chandeleur 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.

In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a “sloping cloud deck” as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.

A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.

The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date. The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

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Helicopter Crashes During Electrical Line Maintanance

The commercial pilot was cleaning electrical power line insulators using a cleaning apparatus mounted on the helicopter. While cleaning, the pilot said the helicopter was hovering about 60 feet above the ground when the engine lost power. He turned away from the power lines, and the helicopter descended rapidly, impacting the ground, and sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and rotor system. The helicopter had a 30-foot articulated spray boom mounted on its right side, a 50-gallon water tank inside, and a pressure pump on the left side.

The equipment was operated by an onboard boom operator. An examination of the helicopter disclosed that both electric fuel boost pump intakes were clogged with a fibrous material. The electric fuel boost pumps serve as conduits for the engine-driven fuel pump, and if they are clogged, no fuel will reach the engine. Similar fibrous material was found in the airframe fuel filter. At a test facility, the engine was started and run without problems. During a re-examination of the airframe, the fuel tank was cut open, and a triangular-shaped 4″ piece of an absorbent pad was found.

Fuel Problems Cited as Cause of Cause

The contract fueler had routinely been shoving the fuel nozzle through a hole in the plastic packaging of a bundle of absorbent pads, into the edges of the pads, to keep fuel from dripping on the tundra. The fueling process was repeated every 7-8 minutes. Samples of the material taken from the fuel pumps, the piece found in the fuel tank, and an exemplar pad provided by the fuel contractor, were sent to a laboratory for testing. The tests revealed that all the samples were essentially identical.

The contamination of the fuel pumps most likely occurred when the fuel nozzle tip cut/captured portions of the absorbent pads when it was placed in the pad bundles, and the cut portions were then pumped into the fuel tanks. The National Transportation Safety Board 9NTSB) determined the probable cause(s) of this accident was due to fuel starvation due to the blockage of fuel inlet screens, and improper service procedures by ground personnel.

Alaska Helicopter Crash – October 20, 2007

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

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Helicopter Crash In Yakima River Canyon

On September 08, 2007, about 1505 Pacific daylight time, a Hughes 369D, N31HM, was hovering on a hillside of the Yakima river canyon in Ellensburg, Washington, when the passenger egressed the helicopter and contacted the main rotor disc. Northwest Helicopters, Inc., was operating the helicopter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a sheep relocating mission for the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW). The commercial pilot and one passenger were not injured; the second passenger was killed. The helicopter was not damaged. The local flight originally departed from Puyallup, Washington, about 0630. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan had not been filed.

During a telephone interview with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, the pilot stated that prior to the accident he and the second passenger, a WDFW biologist, had flown on numerous missions over the course of more than 20 years. The day of the accident, the flight departed early in the morning for the purpose of relocating bighorn sheep. The doors on the left side of the helicopter were removed, enabling the passengers to egress from that side and walk around the nose to the right side, if the situation necessitated such positioning. The front left-seated pilot was maneuvering the helicopter in the Yakima area, and both the gunner (aft left seat) and mugger (aft right seat) where to capture sheep. Thereafter the pilot would then land to refuel, shutting down the helicopter at each fueling.

Helicopter Crash During Animal Tagging Operations

The pilot further stated that after having captured about 16 sheep, he had refueled and departed to the Yakima river canyon. The crew gunned two sheep in one net, and the pilot maneuvered the helicopter onto the hillside (about a 30-percent grade). He continued toe-ing the helicopter into the hillside with the front skids in contact with terrain and the netted sheep off the right side of the helicopter. The second passenger (gunner) egressed the left side, and the pilot watched the right-seated passenger (mugger) as he too prepared to egress. The pilot then heard a loud noise and shut down the helicopter. The second passenger had walked into the rotating main rotor disc.

In a later conversation, the pilot added that earlier on the day of the accident, the crew had also captured two sheep in one net, where one of the sheep had escaped before the second passenger could tend to the net. The pilot opined that the second passenger may have been feeling added pressure on the accident touchdown from both having a goal of capturing 20 sheep and having 2 sheep in one net. He noted that the position of the mugger can be fatiguing with the physical requirements of climbing steep terrain and managing the wild animals.

More Helicopter Crash Details

Northwest Helicopters provided an electronic copy of the company policy manual titled, “Aerial Capture, Eradication, Tagging of Animals (ACETA) Plan” that is given to their employees.

Contained within the “Gunner Training” section, the manual states in pertinent part that “the gunner must be familiar with helicopter operations.” The manual later details the sequence for conducting a net gun shooting operation. It states that following the netting of animal, the pilot is to safely land “as quickly as possible to drop off the gunner to attend the animal” and “if a mugger is also on board they will also depart at this time.” It continues to say, “the pilot will depart to pick up the other processing crew if necessary or land nearby and shutdown to minimize noise trauma to the animal.”

The manual did not contain information on whether a pre mission brief was to be conducted on how to egress the helicopter, or any information provided about how the gunner was to egress.

The pilot was the company trainer.

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

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On September 5, 2007, a Bell 206B Helicopter registered to and operated by Tiger Aviation Sales LLC, experienced a hard landing at Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (KLAL), Lakeland, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 business flight from a construction site located in Oldsmar, Florida, to Lakeland Linder Regional Airport. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and three passengers were not injured. The flight originated about 1445, from Oldsmar, Florida.

The pilot stated that the last wind report indicated the wind was from 050 degrees at 10-15 knots. While landing to a hover into the wind, the nose of the helicopter started turning to the right. He applied left anti-torque pedal input to the stop but was not successful. He then performed a hovering autorotation and touched down heading 180 degrees, bounced, and came to rest upright heading 270 degrees.

Preliminary examination of the helicopter by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector revealed no damage to the tail rotor blades. The main rotor blades were rotated by hand and tail rotor drive continuity was confirmed to the tail rotor blades. The tail rotor blades were then held stationary and the main rotor blades were then rotated in the normal direction of rotation. A “popping or cracking” sound was noted at the forward fitting of the #5 tail rotor drive shaft; evidence of heat discoloration was noted on the exterior surface of the forward fitting of the #5 tail rotor drive shaft.

Phoenix, Arizona News Helicopters Collide Killing Eight
On July 27, 2007 KTVK-TV Channel 3 (Ch 3) and KNXS-TV Channel 15 (Ch 15) news helicopters, N613TV and N215TV, respectively, collided in mid air while maneuvering in Phoenix, Arizona.  The commercial pilots of both helicopters and one photographer in each helicopter were killed. Both news helicopters were destroyed. Channel 15 News Helicopter departed Scottsdale, Arizona, at 1222, and Channel 3 News Helicopter departed Scottsdale at 1232, as local electronic news gathering (ENG) flights. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plans had been filed.

Both news helicopters were covering a police pursuit on local streets. The suspect’s vehicle had been moving, but he stopped, abandoned it, and acquired another vehicle. The collision occurred during this transition.

The media pilots have a letter of agreement (LOA) with the air traffic control tower for Phoenix International Airport. This letter of agreement provides media pilots with standardized procedures to facilitate their movement in and out of the airspace. It also reduces the workload for the controllers.

A Safety Board air traffic control (ATC) specialist interviewed controllers in the Phoenix air traffic control tower. The air traffic manager reported that about 1223, the pilot of police helicopter “Firebird 8” contacted the PHX air traffic control tower local control north (LCN) controller. The Firebird pilot requested permission to enter the Class B airspace about 5 nautical miles (nm) north of downtown at 1,800 feet mean sea level (msl) with automatic terminal information service (ATIS) Kilo, and north clearance via Sharp Echo. The LCN reported radar contact, and cleared the pilot to proceed via Sharp Echo as requested.

At 1226:08, the pilot of Ch 15 advised that he had automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Kilo, was at Camelback Mountain, and requested to enter the Class B airspace via Sharp Echo. The controller acknowledged radar contact, and cleared Ch 15 via Sharp Echo as requested. The pilot indicated that he was heading downtown at 1,800 feet, and intended to intercept the police chase. The tower controller acknowledged and advised that there was a firebird helicopter about 1 1/2 miles west of the Biltmore at 1,900 feet. The Ch 15 pilot reported that he had the helicopter in sight, and would proceed direct to that location. About 2 minutes later, he advised that he was talking to Firebird 8 on another frequency. The tower controller responded that another inbound helicopter was 2 miles north of his position. At 1229:03, the Ch 15 pilot advised that he was climbing to 2,000 feet to stay out of Firebird 8’s way.

About 30 seconds later, LCN cleared SKY 12 into the Class B airspace to also film the chase. The pilot of SKY 12 advised that he would climb to 2,500 feet for traffic avoidance.

Another controller relieved LCN at 1234:39. In the relief briefing, the LCN noted where Firebird 8, Ch 15, and SKY 12 were doing the police chase. Firebird 8 had been cleared in and out of the Class B airspace at his discretion. SKY 12 was the helicopter at 2,500 feet.

At 1235:29, the pilot of Newshawk 5 advised that he was inbound at 2,200 feet with the ATIS. He further stated he would like to come inbound, operate with the other helicopters, and would be talking to them. The LCN controller allowed him to enter the Class B airspace, advised that three helicopters were out there, and offered to give him the call signs. The pilot responded that he had Firebird, SKY 12, and Ch 15 in sight, and thought that Ch 3 was behind him. The LCN tower controller acknowledged.

The Channel 3 news helicopter pilot made radio contact with the LCN controller at 1236:41. Ten seconds later the pilot stated that he was on the west side of Piestewa Peak, requested Sharp Echo for the North Bravo, and was going where the other helicopters were. LCN acknowledged radar contact, and cleared him to proceed via Sharp Echo as requested. LCN pointed out that there were three helicopters on site, and Newshawk 5 was about a mile ahead him. The pilot stated that he had Newshawk in sight, and a couple of the others in sight as well.

At 1244:40, the pilot of SKYFOX 10 advised LCN that he was at Piestewa Peak, and would like to operate in the Class B airspace under Sharp Echo with the others. He stated that he had the other helicopters in sight and would be talking to them. LCN acknowledged radar contact 1 mile southwest of Piestewa Peak, and cleared the pilot in via Sharp Echo as requested. He advised the pilot that there were about five helicopters on site, and one that was just passing his nose. The pilot advised that he saw the helicopter passing in front, and was talking to the other ones.

At 1246:21, the SKYFOX 10 pilot advised that there had just been a midair collision over a park, and that two helicopters were down. About 2 minutes later, the pilot advised that Channel 15 news helicopter and the Channel 3 news helicopter were involved in the collision.

In an interview, the pilot stated that as he was entering the area, the accident helicopters were positioned a reasonable distance apart when he first noticed them. The police helicopter then broadcast that there was going to be a car jacking. He stated that as a pilot, this would indicate to him that he would have to change his position. He glanced away for a moment, and looked back to the accident helicopters while flying toward them. He noted that they had moved closer together. Shortly thereafter, they impacted. He could not say for sure the relative position of each helicopter, but noted that after the collision, Ch 3 broke into many pieces. Ch 15 remained in the air for a second, and then dove nose-first into the ground.

Ch 15 and was on the left side of Ch 3. Upon impact, witnesses said that Ch 3 broke into many pieces and fell to the ground spinning. Ch 15 remained relatively intact except for the main rotor blades. It pointed nose down and collided with the ground. There were no reports of erratic movements prior to the collision, and no unusual sounds or smoke.

Channel 3 News Helicopter Information

The pilot was 42 years old. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that he received a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land on December 13, 1982. He obtained a commercial pilot certificate on August 24, 1987, with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot held a certified flight instructor (CFI) certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter; he obtained his most recent certificate on April 27, 2007. The FAA reported that they had no record of accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions in their database involving this pilot.

The FAA issued the pilot a second-class medical certificate on August 8, 2006; it had no limitations or waivers.

Channel 3 News Helicopter Information
The pilot was 47 years old. A review of FAA airman records revealed that he received a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter on May 23, 1990. He obtained a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter on December 7, 1990. The FAA reported that they had no record of accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions in their database involving this pilot.

The FAA issued the pilot a second-class medical certificate on December 27, 2006. He held a Statement of Demonstrated Ability (waiver) for defective color vision.

Channel 3 & 15 News Helicopters Wreckage

The main wreckage for each helicopter was in Steele Indian School Park, and they were about 160 feet apart. The accident site elevation was 1,100 feet. The main debris field, which encompassed components from both helicopters, was about 2,160 feet long and 560 feet wide, and north of Indian School Road. The only pieces of debris south of Indian School Road were an outboard segment of the yellow main rotor blade from the Ch 3 helicopter and an outboard segment of the red main rotor blade from the Ch 15 helicopter.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Wreckage Examination

The main rotor blades for the AS350B2 rotate clockwise.

N13TV

The Ch 3 helicopter’s cabin was primarily white. The forward half of the tail boom was red. Going aft, the tail boom paint scheme transitioned to dark orange; this section included the horizontal stabilizers. Aft of the horizontal stabilizers, it transitioned to light orange; the tail rotor was attached to this section. The aft portion of the tail boom consisted of the vertical stabilizer and tail cone, which were yellow.

Airframe

Fire consumed most of the main fuselage section. The tail boom section separated into several pieces.

The section of the tail boom forward of the tail rotor comprised one section. It had clockwise crush damage. The forward right section of the right horizontal stabilizer had a camera attached, and separated in an upward direction. The aft section of the left stabilizer separated, and was north of the main wreckage. It exhibited accordion crush damage in an outward direction. Investigators observed smeared zinc chromate primer transfer in a clockwise direction on the upper center section of the tail boom and horizontal stabilizer.

The aft tail boom comprised another piece. It exhibited a crush mark on the left side that was upward and to the right.

The remainder of the tail section with the tail rotor attached comprised a third major piece. The right side of the vertical fin exhibited punctures with black rub marks. The front of this section exhibited clockwise twisting with blue-gray paint and zinc chromate primer transfer. One tail rotor exhibited a flattened strike tab with chordwise scoring and orange paint transfer on the leading edge. The airframe manufacturer’s investigator noted indications of flapping. The tail rotor drive shaft separated at the front end of this separated section; the fracture surface was angular and twisted. The tail rotor pitch change rod separated just forward of the tail rotor bell crank input along a 45-degree angle.

Main Rotor Blades

Red Blade

Charring encompassed the area 4 to 5 feet from the blade root. The blade portion aft of the spar from approximately 11 feet out was missing. The blade sustained mechanical damage and separation 14 to 15 feet from the blade root. Investigators observed blue-gray and orange paint transfer marks on the leading edge from about 12 feet out to the separation point. The end plate and weights separated; investigators recovered them several hundred feet north-northwest of the main wreckage.

Blue Blade

Investigators observed significant mechanical damage 5 feet and 11 feet from the blade root, and the blade separated at these points. The leading edge stainless steel strip was missing from 9 to 11 feet. The blade sustained thermal damage from the root out to 11 feet; there was no thermal damage on the outboard separated pieces. The end plate was intact.

Yellow Blade

The blade portion aft of the spar was missing from 4 feet 4 inches and outboard. Investigators observed mechanical damage to the leading edge 5 feet from the blade root, and the blade separated at this point. The blade sustained mechanical damage 13 to 14 feet from the root. The 9- to 13-foot area sustained thermal damage. The outer 1 1/2 feet of the blade, with the end plate attached, separated; this piece on a parking garage rooftop. It was 1,050 feet southwest of the Ch 3 main wreckage site. The outboard leading edge of this piece exhibited in excess of 90 degrees forward bending mechanical damage. The yellow Starflex blade sleeve exhibited the most severe damage of the three sleeves; it exhibited severe broomstraw damage.

Engine

Post accident examination of the CH 3 engine revealed substantial impact and post-impact fire damage. The axial compressor ruptured from the gas generator between the intermediate casing and the turbine casing assembly of the gas generator. The axial rotor appeared solidly packed with mud and debris. The axial compressor’s blades exhibited mechanical damage in the form of gouges and scratches. The nose bullet was in place, and appeared undamaged. The compressor case and combustion chamber ruptured. The linking tube appeared flattened. The short shaft separated from the triangular flange at the rear of the turbine reduction gear; it exhibited torsional twist. The short shaft exhibited rotational scarring aft of the forward attach flange. The free turbine blades were in place, and the tips of the leading edges appeared chipped and broken.

N215TV

The CH 15 helicopter was primarily dark blue along the top of the cabin, tail boom, and tail; the lower part of the cabin was yellow.

Airframe

Fire consumed most of the main wreckage.

Main Rotor Blades

Red Blade

The leading edge sustained mechanical damage 6 1/2 feet from the root; the blade separated at this point. The blade section aft of the spar was missing from the separation point to 12 feet 8 inches from the root. The leading edge stainless steel strip was also missing from this area. The outboard 2 feet 8 inches of the blade separated, and hit a delivery truck parked at 4041 North Central Avenue. This was 1,040 feet southwest of the Ch 15 main wreckage, and about 180 feet from the separated yellow blade piece from the Ch 3 helicopter. It damaged the hood of the truck, and came to rest about 10 feet away. The end plate was in place.

Blue Blade

The leading edge sustained mechanical damage and separated 4 feet 8 inches from the root. The inboard sections of the blade sustained thermal damage. Large sections of blade skin and foam core were missing. Investigators observed leading edge mechanical damage and forward bending from 9 feet 7 inches to 12 feet 10 inches. One piece from this area separated; it was inside the park boundaries about 560 feet south of the main wreckage.

Yellow Blade

The blade sustained thermal damage from the root out to 8 feet 9 inches. Investigators observed severe mechanical damage and separation from 8 feet 9 inches to 11 feet 9 inches. A section of the leading edge stainless steel strip from this area exhibited blue-gray paint transfer marks. The blade section outboard of 11 feet 9 inches separated. This piece was within the park boundaries, and about 520 feet south of the main wreckage. It did not exhibit any thermal damage; the end plate was in place.

Engine

Post accident examination of the CH 15 engine revealed substantial impact and post-crash fire damage. The axial rotor blades appeared bent in a direction opposite the direction of rotation. The nose bullet appeared flattened and smeared in a direction opposite that of rotation. The coupling tube between the engine and main rotor transmission ruptured; it exhibited torsional twist. The linking tube was twisted. The transmission shaft ruptured, and exhibited torsional twist. The short shaft separated from the triangular flange at the rear of the turbine reduction gear, and twisted; however, it remained connected to the triangular flange by a portion of the flexible coupling. The free turbine blades were in place, and appeared undamaged.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Collision Avoidance Systems

The Ch 3 helicopter had a SkyWatch traffic advisory system on board. The system provided audio warning and displayed targets on the helicopter’s Garmin 430 navigation unit. The Ch 3 chief pilot stated that turning the system on was part of the power-up checklist and that the system worked when he flew the helicopter earlier on the day of the accident. The Ch 15 helicopter did not have a traffic advisory and collision avoidance system aboard.

Post Accident Meeting with Phoenix ENG Pilots

The ENG pilots for the Phoenix area met with investigators regarding the midair collision. The group reported that they were a close-nit community, and were in communication daily. All pilots except for Ch 15 operated out of the same hangar; Ch 15 operated out of a nearby hangar.

The pilots indicated that when they receive a call of an event, the helicopter(s) is dispatched. The first pilot to arrive on scene establishes a position. All aircraft are on the same discreet air-to-air frequency (123.025), which law enforcement also monitors. As additional pilots enter the area, the pilots transmit their altitudes and positions to each other. If someone is going to change position, they transmit how and where they are changing. In the case of the accident flight, the other news pilots flying believed that the communication was adequate between the two accident pilots. In addition to the common air-to-air frequency, pilots also maintain radio contact (via separate frequencies) with the tower, their station, and their other crewmembers over an intercom. When pilots are broadcasting live, they advise the other pilots on the local frequency, and depending on the length of the broadcast, will also notify the tower. During the broadcast, the pilot continues to monitor the common frequencies.

Except for Channel 12, all operators use a combination pilot/reporter. Channel 12 uses a photographer/reporter. All helicopters are equipped with a photographer, who operates the camera; the pilot has visual access to a monitor that is mounted near the instrument panel.

During missions involving the police helicopter, the media helicopters remain 500 feet above it. There is constant chatter on the discreet frequency regarding positions. There are times when a pilot will lose sight of another helicopter over the city, because the helicopter blends into the ground clutter making it difficult to discern.

Safety Suggestions

The pilots suggested the following safety improvements:

1. High visibility main rotor and tail rotor blades
2. LED anti-collision strobe lights
3. Improved position lights
4. Quarterly meetings
5. Helicopter Association International (HAI) support

Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)

FAR 91.111 addresses operating near other aircraft. It states in part that no person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. FAR 91.113 states in part that vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.

Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48C Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance

According to AC 90-48C, “…the flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) set forth the concept of “See and Avoid.” This concept requires that vigilance shall be maintained at all times, by each person operating an aircraft, regardless of whether the operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

“Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that most NMAC [mid-air collision] accidents and reported MAC [near mid-air collisions] occur during good VFR weather conditions and during the hours of daylight.”

The AC further states, “pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision as well as periodically scan the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic. The probability of spotting a potential collision threat increases with the time spent looking outside, but certain techniques may be used to increase the effectiveness of the scan time. The human eyes tend to focus somewhere, even in a featureless sky. In order to be most effective, the pilot should shift glances and refocus at intervals. Pilots should also realize that their eyes may require several seconds to refocus when switching views between items in the cockpit and distance objects. Peripheral vision can be most useful in spotting collision threats from other aircraft. Pilots are reminded of the requirements to move one’s head in order to search around the physical obstructions, such as door and window posts.”News Helicopter Crash occurred July 27, 2007 in Phoenix, AZ

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

Fire Fighting Helicopter Crash Kills One

The accident occurred while the helicopter was supporting firefighting efforts with long-line operations. Two days prior to the accident, the division group supervisor (DIVS) anchored a colored reflective panel used for indicating landing and drop zones at the accident location. The DIVS stated that no site assessment was performed at the time of the panel placement because the placement was not intended to be the indicator of the drop zone for blivet deliveries. The terrain in the area consisted of steep slopes and trees varying in height from 75 to 200 feet.

One day prior to the accident, the location of the panel was not changed from the previous day and remained as placed by the DIVS. The accident helicopter, equipped with a 150-foot-long line, then made the blivet drop within 3 feet of the panel. The marshaller stated he warned the pilot about the proximity of one tree that was located to the right and upslope. Two ground crew members distanced themselves from the blivet drop because they were concerned with their own safety due to the tree hazards.

The division safety officer visited the site immediately after the blivet operation and there was no discussion regarding the aircraft use, the drop zone, or any discernment on the part of any crew member regarding the safety of the operation. In addition, there was no discussion about the operation during the “After-Action Review” (AAR) at the overnight camp that evening. On the day of the accident prior to the day’s missions, there was no safety assessment or organized AAR conducted.

The accident pilot was told that he would be delivering two more blivets to the same drop zone and back hauling the empty blivets that had been delivered the day before. At the intended drop zone, two crew members, who were not the same from the previous day, were so concerned about the potential for an accident that they briefed each other three times on what action would be taken in the event of an accident; however, this was not discussed with the pilot. The panel was not moved and the drop zone site remained in the same location as the previous day.

 The marshaller communicated with the DIVS that a longer long-line was recommended so the helicopter could remain above the trees; however, the helicopter had already departed. Witnesses observed that as the blivets were set down on the ground, the helicopter drifted to the right and the main rotor blades contacted a 165-foot-tall tree about 15 feet from the top. The long-line, along with the blivets, remained attached to the helicopter as it made a turn to the left, stopped momentarily, and then flew downhill to ground impact.

The helicopter impacted several trees and was destroyed by post impact fire. No anomalies were noted with the airframe and engine that would have precluded normal operation prior to the accident. The helicopter was approved for the pilot to operate the aircraft from the left seat. Visibility to the right side of the helicopter was partially obstructed by aircraft structure, passenger seats, and the seat headrests.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause(s) of this accident due to the pilot’s failure to maintain clearance with the trees during a long-line operation. Other contributing factors was the Forest Service’s inadequate communication between crews, failure to properly assess the safety of the intended drop zone, reduced visibility to the right side of the helicopter, and the trees.

Firefighting Helicopter Crash – July 23, 2007 in Happy Camp, CA

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

The pilot stated that the purpose of the flight was to perform a final rinse load on an avocado orchard they had been spraying that day. After finishing with the load, they began the short return flight back to the truck. The pilot maneuvered the helicopter in a shallow right turn over a steep hill with about 80-percent power. With the helicopter about 20 feet above ground level (agl), and about 5 feet above the treetops, it made an uncommanded yaw. The pilot maneuvered toward a flat area and simultaneously experienced a loss of rotor revolutions per minute (rpm). The helicopter settled into the trees on a 75-degree slope. He shut off the engine and egressed the helicopter.

The pilot further noted that the main rotor appear to cut surrounding trees, which were about 6-inch thick in diameter. He stated that helicopter had over 14 gallons of fuel on board.

An Aerospatiale AS-350BA helicopter, N209CH, sustained substantial damage when its main rotor blades struck trees during landing on Talsani Island, located in the Lynn Canal, about 13 miles east-southeast of Haines, Alaska.

The helicopter was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) local area on-demand air taxi flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. The helicopter was operated by Coastal Helicopters Inc., Juneau, Alaska. The airline transport certificated pilot, and the two passengers, were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from a nearby landing area about 1545.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on April 7, the director of operations for the operator reported that the pilot was landing in an area of grass near the beach of the island. Just before touchdown, the pilot told the director of operations that the main rotor blades struck several trees. The director of operations indicated that the rotor blades could not be repaired at his facility, and were being sent to a blade repair facility.

On September 2, 2005, approximately 1240 mountain daylight time, an Aerospatiale SA315B, single-engine helicopter, N220SH, operated by Skydance Northwestern, Inc., Minden, Nevada, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain following a loss of control during an external load operation approximately 11 miles southwest of the Duchesne Municipal Airport (U69), Duchesne, Utah. The airline transport pilot, sole occupant of the helicopter, was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The flight was being conducted under Title 14 CFR Part 133 without a flight plan. The flight departed a remote landing zone near Duchesne, Utah, approximately 1200.

According to the pilot, he was attempting to lift a 1,500 pound drill rig that was attached to the end of a 75-foot long line at a terrain elevation of approximately 7,000 feet msl. As the drill was being lifted off the ground, the helicopter “suddenly [and] violently accelerated (pitched) down [and] left.” The pilot attempted to correct the uncommanded movement by applying right aft cyclic; however, the helicopter began a “rapid spin to the left.” A ground witness observed the helicopter complete 3 or 4, 360-degree rotations. The pilot then closed the throttle to the flight idle position, and the left rotation stopped. The helicopter entered a descent toward the terrain with approximately 10 knots of forward airspeed. Approximately 30-40 feel above ground level (agl), the pilot pulled the “remaining” collective to slow the descent and rotor RPM. The helicopter’s main rotor blades contacted trees, and subsequently the helicopter came to rest on its right side. The pilot then shut off the fuel cut off, secured the electrical equipment, and exited the helicopter. During the accident sequence, the pilot did not jettison the external load. The pilot reported the wind conditions as “calm” and the temperature 71 degrees Fahrenheit at the time of the accident.

Examination by an Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector at the accident site revealed the tail rotor driveshaft was intact, no particles were found on the tail rotor and transmission magnetic chip detectors, and no damage was noted to the tail rotor blades.

The airframe was examined under the supervision of a FAA inspector at the operator’s headquarters in Minden, Nevada. Examination of the airframe revealed no anomalies with the main transmission, tail rotor drive, airframe fuel, and flight control systems. A fuel sample was obtained and tested with no evidence of contamination noted. In addition, the operator tested the fuel from the supplier at the time of the accident with no contamination or anomalies noted.

A review of the engine records revealed at the time of the accident, the airframe had accumulated 19,658.4 hours and the engine had accumulated 3,216.5 total hours and 318.6 hours since overhaul. On August 31, 2005, the helicopter underwent a 100-hour inspection, at a total airframe time of 19,637.4 hours.

On November 29, 2005, at the facilities of Heli-Support, Inc., Fort Collins, Colorado, under the supervision of the NTSB investigator-in-charge, the Turbomeca Artouste III B1 engine (serial number 1818) was examined and functionally tested. A borescope examination of the engine revealed deposits in and on all fuel injector wheel holes. The deposit material and source of the material was not determined. The injector wheel contamination was not removed prior to the functionally test of the engine. Upon completion of the visual and borescope examination, the engine was functionally tested in accordance approved manufacturer’s test procedures in a dynamometer equipped test cell. The functional test of the engine met or exceeded manufacturer’s specifications, and no anomalies were noted with the engine.

The fuel pump and speed governor were removed from the engine and functionally tested. Flows were within serviceable limits for repair functional test. No anomalies were noted with the fuel pump and speed governor.

After the functional test of the engine, the engine was reborescoped. The borescope examination revealed deposits to a lesser degree, in and on the injector wheel holes.

SOURCE: NTSB

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

Vegetation Eradication Helicopter Crash

On April 20, 2005, about 0745 eastern daylight time, a Bell 206B, N2285B, registered to and operated by Heliworks, Inc., rolled over while lifting off from the Everglades near Coral Springs, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 135 local, other work use flight from Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and two passengers were not injured. One passenger sustained serious injuries. The flight originated about 0700, from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport.

The pilot verbally stated that after takeoff, the flight proceeded approximately 15 miles west to Sawgrass Park where he landed and picked up three workers. He completed a load manifest and computed the weight and balance. He then proceeded to a site for vegetation eradication, and after landing, the workers got out, sprayed, then returned. He then departed again to another site where one of the workers got out, sprayed, and returned to the helicopter. He lifted up straight and the right side “popped up fast.” He lowered collective and applied right cyclic to correct the roll which had no affect; the helicopter rolled onto its left side. He further reported he did not perceive a problem with the helicopter or flight controls.

Examination of pictures provided by the operator revealed the helicopter was resting on its left side partially submerged. The tailboom was fractured but in close proximity to the wreckage and damage was noted to the bottom of the fuselage just aft of the aft crosstube. One of the main rotor blades was visible. According to FAA personnel, during recovery, the helicopter was dropped from a height of approximately 20-30 feet.

National Transportation Safety Board examination of the helicopter following recovery revealed the main rotor mast was fractured just below the static stop contact zone; the fracture surface circumferentially exhibited 45-degree shear lips. Both main rotor blades were fractured; 45 degree shear lips were noted on the fracture surfaces of both blades. One of the two main rotor blades was fractured approximately 152.5 inches from the centerline of the attach bolt; blue colored paint was noted on the leading edge of the blade. The other blade was fractured approximately 148 inches from the centerline of the attach bolt; blue colored paint was noted on the upper surface of the blade. The tailboom was separated at approximately boom station 63. One section of tailrotor drive shaft was displaced due to aft displacement of the 2nd tailrotor drive shaft bearing.

Examination of the left rear seat revealed the seatback cushion was not in-place, and the shoulder harness was connected to the lapbelt, but the male and female ends of the lapbelt were not connected. Examination of the right rear seat revealed the shoulder harness was connected to the lapbelt but the male and female ends of the lapbelt were not connected.

Examination of the collective flight control system revealed control tube assembly continuity from the cockpit to the lever assembly; a fracture was noted to the bellcrank P/N 206-001-568-001, near the area where the tube assembly connects. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted on the fracture surface of the bellcrank assembly. Examination of the cyclic flight control system revealed control tube assembly continuity from the cockpit to each bellcrank assembly.

Each control tube assembly was fractured between the bellcrank assembly and the inner ring assembly. Both fractured control tubes were bent and exhibited “D” shaped deformation in the area of the fracture surface. One pitch link assembly was fractured between the attach point on the outer ring assembly and the attach point near the main rotor blade. The other pitch link assembly remained connected to the attach point near the main rotor blade, but the other end was not connected to the outer ring assembly. The end of the pitch link that was separated from the outer ring assembly still had the securing hardware and bearing connected to the end of the link. Examination of the outer ring assembly revealed one of the pitch link assembly attach point fitting was fractured; no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction was noted to the fracture surface. The left and right cyclic, and the collective servo actuators were removed from the airplane for further examination at the helicopter manufacturer’s facility with FAA oversight.

Bench testing of the left cyclic servo actuator (S/N 6608) revealed the relief valve pressure “cracked” at 810 psig (specification is 825 to 895 psig test port pressure). The relief valve closed at 570 psig (specification is that it must close within 120 psig of the cracking pressure). During the “Manual Operation Test”, the manual force to move the cylinder was 44 pounds (specification is 26 pounds or less). All other sections of the test procedure were within normal limits. Testing of a sample of fluid revealed the particle count was greater than specified for all channels. Bench testing of the right cyclic servo actuator (S/N 2310) revealed with respect to the “Servo Valve Leakage Test”, the leakage amount was 50cc/minute (specification is 20 cc/minute). All other sections of the test procedure were within limits. Testing of a sample of fluid revealed the particle count was greater than specified for all but one of the five channels.

Bench testing of the collective servo actuator (S/N 6576), revealed that with respect to the “Manual Operation Test”, the unit did not move when a force of 40 pounds was applied (specification is 26 pounds or less). A force of 600 psi (normal 206B system pressure) was applied to the pressure port with the return port open and the cylinder would cycle. A “thick black material” was noted extruding from each end of the barrel. Further testing of the collective servo actuator with respect to the “Un-Boosted Force Test” revealed the peak force to cause movement of the piston ranged from 134 to 92 pounds in the retract direction and 88 to 121 pounds in the extend direction. The servo was then disassembled which revealed a localized area of “…fresh burnishing” of one side of the inboard gland bore. The piston rod was checked for straightness using “V-blocks” and a dial indicator and the total dial indicator run-out was .0065 inch.

The helicopter minus the retained components was released to David E. Gourgues, Regional Manager for CTC Services Aviation (LAD) Inc., on November 10, 2005. All NTSB retained components were also released to David Gourgues, on March 29, 2006.

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer