Bell 206 L1 Crashes Offshore

 On December 29, 2007, at 1531 central standard time, a single-engine Bell 206L1 helicopter, N211EL, impacted the water in the Gulf of Mexico following a loss of control during approach. One passenger was fatally injured, the commercial pilot sustained serious injuries and two other passengers received minor injuries. The helicopter was owned and operated by Air Logistics LLC., of New Iberia, Louisiana.

The flight originated from offshore platform Chandeleur 63 and was destined for offshore platform South Pass 38, both in the Gulf of Mexico. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight. All times in this report will be based on central standard time using the 24-hour format.

In a telephone interview with the NTSB, the pilot reported encountering a “sloping cloud deck” as he approached the offshore platform for landing. The pilot added that while in a left turn to final approach, he began slowing the helicopter to 20-25 knots and encountered a tail wind. The pilot noticed a settling tendency and reduced the left bank. Additionally, the pilot reported experiencing vibrations and shaking from the helicopter. The pilot added forward cyclic and increased power. The vibration and shaking became worse and the pilot recognized the symptoms of a settling with power event. Due to the low altitude, the pilot was unable to recover the helicopter or deploy the emergency floatation devices prior to water impact. All four occupants survived the initial crash and egressed the helicopter.

A life raft was not deployed prior to the helicopter sinking. The four personnel attempted to swim to the unmanned platform located approximately 100 yards away and were separated by the 8 to 10 foot wave swells. Personnel were located by local boats and the United States Coast Guard. The pilot, who was the last survivor to be rescued from the water, was in the water for approximately 2 and 1/2 hours.

The helicopter sank in approximately 115 feet of water. The helicopter was located and recovery is in progress. Upon recovery the helicopter will be transported to a secure facility pending examination at a later date. The pilot reported the weather at South Pass 38 was estimated to start at 500 feet ceiling and 5 miles visibility and reduce to approximately 300 feet ceiling and one mile visibility on final. At 1751 an automated weather reporting facility located about 22-nautical miles to the northwest reported winds from 030 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling overcast at 1,000- feet, temperature 55 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 51 degrees Fahrenheit, and a barometric pressure of 30.05 inches of Mercury.

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

NTSB Report ANC08FA025
Accident occurred Monday, December 03, 2007 in Whittier, AK
Aircraft: Eurocopter BK117C1, registration: N141LG
Injuries: 4 Fatal.
EMS Helicopter Crash Details:
On December 3, 2007, about 1718 Alaska standard time, a Eurocopter BK117C1 helicopter, N141LG, is presumed to have sustained substantial damage during an in-flight collision with ocean waters, about 3 miles east of Whittier, Alaska. The helicopter was being operated by Evergreen Alaska Helicopters, Inc., under contract to Lifeguard, Providence Hospital, Anchorage, Alaska, as a visual flight rules (VFR) patient transport flight under Title 14, CFR Part 135, when the accident occurred. The flight nurse received fatal injuries. The commercial certificated pilot, paramedic, and patient are missing, and presumed to have received fatal injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of the accident, and company VFR flight following procedures were in effect. The flight departed Cordova, Alaska, about 1630.

During the flight from Cordova to Anchorage, the pilot communicated the helicopter’s position and estimated time of arrival in Anchorage, to the hospital’s communications center at 10 minute intervals. The helicopter was reported missing when the pilot failed to make a subsequent position report, and attempts to communicate with the pilot failed.

The Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (ARCC) initiated a search for the missing helicopter, and on December 8, the body of the flight nurse and some wreckage were found floating in Passage Canal near Whittier. On December 10, the active search for the helicopter and its three missing occupants was called off. NOTE: This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Pilot Killed after Main Rotor Blade Hits Him

After arriving at the destination airport, the pilot taxied the helicopter to the fuel pumps. The pilot then realized that the fuel pumps were for aviation gasoline and not for jet fuel, so he advised the passengers that he would assist them in unloading, and then reposition the helicopter to the other fuel pump. After carrying the passengers’ bags and using the restroom at the fixed base operator, the pilot returned to the helicopter. While walking toward the unoccupied helicopter, the pilot was struck by the idling main rotor. The helicopter’s rotorcraft flight manual did not describe a procedure for the pilot to exit the helicopter while the engine and rotor continued to operate, but did state that during shutdown the pilot should, “Remain on the flight controls until the rotor has come to a complete stop.” Additionally, post-accident examination of the helicopter revealed that the cyclic friction lock was not tightened, which contradicted with the flight manual’s shutdown checklist. The substance found during the post-mortem toxicological testing of the pilot would not normally be expected to cause impairment of psychomotor or cognitive functions. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause(s) of this accident due to the pilot failing to maintain adequate clearance from the idling main rotor blade. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to comply with the manufacturer’s procedure for securing the helicopter.

The helicopter accident death occurred November 09, 2007 in Morristown, TN.

Helicopter Crashes During Electrical Line Maintanance

The commercial pilot was cleaning electrical power line insulators using a cleaning apparatus mounted on the helicopter. While cleaning, the pilot said the helicopter was hovering about 60 feet above the ground when the engine lost power. He turned away from the power lines, and the helicopter descended rapidly, impacting the ground, and sustaining substantial damage to the fuselage and rotor system. The helicopter had a 30-foot articulated spray boom mounted on its right side, a 50-gallon water tank inside, and a pressure pump on the left side.

The equipment was operated by an onboard boom operator. An examination of the helicopter disclosed that both electric fuel boost pump intakes were clogged with a fibrous material. The electric fuel boost pumps serve as conduits for the engine-driven fuel pump, and if they are clogged, no fuel will reach the engine. Similar fibrous material was found in the airframe fuel filter. At a test facility, the engine was started and run without problems. During a re-examination of the airframe, the fuel tank was cut open, and a triangular-shaped 4″ piece of an absorbent pad was found.

Fuel Problems Cited as Cause of Cause

The contract fueler had routinely been shoving the fuel nozzle through a hole in the plastic packaging of a bundle of absorbent pads, into the edges of the pads, to keep fuel from dripping on the tundra. The fueling process was repeated every 7-8 minutes. Samples of the material taken from the fuel pumps, the piece found in the fuel tank, and an exemplar pad provided by the fuel contractor, were sent to a laboratory for testing. The tests revealed that all the samples were essentially identical.

The contamination of the fuel pumps most likely occurred when the fuel nozzle tip cut/captured portions of the absorbent pads when it was placed in the pad bundles, and the cut portions were then pumped into the fuel tanks. The National Transportation Safety Board 9NTSB) determined the probable cause(s) of this accident was due to fuel starvation due to the blockage of fuel inlet screens, and improper service procedures by ground personnel.

Alaska Helicopter Crash – October 20, 2007

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

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Two Killed in Florida Helicopter Crash

On September 11, 2007, a Bell 206B registered to Biscayne Helicopter Inc. and operated by Southland Helicopters impacted into the ocean near Nokomis, Florida.  The commercial-rated pilot of the Bell 206B received serious injuries and two passengers received fatal injuries. The Bell helicopter was destroyed. The helicopter flight originated from the Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport, Sarasota, Florida, earlier that day, about 0840.

A witnesses on a boat stated that the helicopter was being used to take photos of the racing boat he was piloting for a boating magazine. The helicopter was flying at about seven to ten feet off the water, about 100 yards in front of and to the left of the boat. They were traveling about 85 mph. The helicopter was flying pretty much straight ahead, but maybe crabbing about 5 degrees so that the right door was a little more visible.

The pilot was flying the helicopter from the right seat. One of the passengers was in the left front seat and the other passenger, the photographer, was taking pictures out the right rear door opening, sort of leaning out the door. The photographer is usually connected to a harness strap attached to the inside of the helicopter. We were traveling directly into a very mild head wind of 5 mph or less.

The seas were calm and nearly flat, especially closer to shore. As he was following the helicopter with the boat, it (the helicopter) seemed to get a little lower in altitude, which I felt, was lower than I had ever seen it. Then it rose back up slightly and immediately started descending until it hit the water. It seemed almost as if it glided in at consistent angle; it appeared that the first contact with the water was the front radius section of the right skid. Immediately, the helicopter tumbled vertically to where the bottom of the aircraft was seen for a split second.

The helicopter then disintegrated violently and immediately with water, parts and debris flying into the path of the boat which was still traveling at a speed of about 85 mph. He instinctively turned the boat to the right and ducked down. The passenger, in the boat with him, also ducked as they passed through the flying debris and wreckage. He recalled the sound of pieces of the helicopter hitting the boat as they passed. At this point they were already turning in a clockwise direction. They continued in the circle 270 degrees back to where the helicopter had crashed. He pulled up just seaward of the debris field, put the boat in neutral and shut of the motors.

The witness called 911 on the cell phone at 10 AM; according to the call log in his cell phone. He reported a helicopter crash in the Gulf of Mexico south or outside of Big Pass. He was actually not aware that they were as close to Venice as they were.

The helicopter’s top section, instrument panels, engine, transmission, dive shaft, tail boom, bottom section, skids, and rotor head with sections of the main rotor blades were recovery from under the water, relative to the point of impact. The damage to the recovered components was consistent with a high speed impact. The helicopter’s four doors were retrieved; they were removed and left at the fix base operations facility from where the helicopter departed from before the accident flight.

Helicopter Crash In Yakima River Canyon

On September 08, 2007, about 1505 Pacific daylight time, a Hughes 369D, N31HM, was hovering on a hillside of the Yakima river canyon in Ellensburg, Washington, when the passenger egressed the helicopter and contacted the main rotor disc. Northwest Helicopters, Inc., was operating the helicopter under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91, as a sheep relocating mission for the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW). The commercial pilot and one passenger were not injured; the second passenger was killed. The helicopter was not damaged. The local flight originally departed from Puyallup, Washington, about 0630. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan had not been filed.

During a telephone interview with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, the pilot stated that prior to the accident he and the second passenger, a WDFW biologist, had flown on numerous missions over the course of more than 20 years. The day of the accident, the flight departed early in the morning for the purpose of relocating bighorn sheep. The doors on the left side of the helicopter were removed, enabling the passengers to egress from that side and walk around the nose to the right side, if the situation necessitated such positioning. The front left-seated pilot was maneuvering the helicopter in the Yakima area, and both the gunner (aft left seat) and mugger (aft right seat) where to capture sheep. Thereafter the pilot would then land to refuel, shutting down the helicopter at each fueling.

Helicopter Crash During Animal Tagging Operations

The pilot further stated that after having captured about 16 sheep, he had refueled and departed to the Yakima river canyon. The crew gunned two sheep in one net, and the pilot maneuvered the helicopter onto the hillside (about a 30-percent grade). He continued toe-ing the helicopter into the hillside with the front skids in contact with terrain and the netted sheep off the right side of the helicopter. The second passenger (gunner) egressed the left side, and the pilot watched the right-seated passenger (mugger) as he too prepared to egress. The pilot then heard a loud noise and shut down the helicopter. The second passenger had walked into the rotating main rotor disc.

In a later conversation, the pilot added that earlier on the day of the accident, the crew had also captured two sheep in one net, where one of the sheep had escaped before the second passenger could tend to the net. The pilot opined that the second passenger may have been feeling added pressure on the accident touchdown from both having a goal of capturing 20 sheep and having 2 sheep in one net. He noted that the position of the mugger can be fatiguing with the physical requirements of climbing steep terrain and managing the wild animals.

More Helicopter Crash Details

Northwest Helicopters provided an electronic copy of the company policy manual titled, “Aerial Capture, Eradication, Tagging of Animals (ACETA) Plan” that is given to their employees.

Contained within the “Gunner Training” section, the manual states in pertinent part that “the gunner must be familiar with helicopter operations.” The manual later details the sequence for conducting a net gun shooting operation. It states that following the netting of animal, the pilot is to safely land “as quickly as possible to drop off the gunner to attend the animal” and “if a mugger is also on board they will also depart at this time.” It continues to say, “the pilot will depart to pick up the other processing crew if necessary or land nearby and shutdown to minimize noise trauma to the animal.”

The manual did not contain information on whether a pre mission brief was to be conducted on how to egress the helicopter, or any information provided about how the gunner was to egress.

The pilot was the company trainer.

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

On September 5, 2007, a Bell 206B Helicopter registered to and operated by Tiger Aviation Sales LLC, experienced a hard landing at Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (KLAL), Lakeland, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 business flight from a construction site located in Oldsmar, Florida, to Lakeland Linder Regional Airport. The helicopter was substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and three passengers were not injured. The flight originated about 1445, from Oldsmar, Florida.

The pilot stated that the last wind report indicated the wind was from 050 degrees at 10-15 knots. While landing to a hover into the wind, the nose of the helicopter started turning to the right. He applied left anti-torque pedal input to the stop but was not successful. He then performed a hovering autorotation and touched down heading 180 degrees, bounced, and came to rest upright heading 270 degrees.

Preliminary examination of the helicopter by an FAA Airworthiness Inspector revealed no damage to the tail rotor blades. The main rotor blades were rotated by hand and tail rotor drive continuity was confirmed to the tail rotor blades. The tail rotor blades were then held stationary and the main rotor blades were then rotated in the normal direction of rotation. A “popping or cracking” sound was noted at the forward fitting of the #5 tail rotor drive shaft; evidence of heat discoloration was noted on the exterior surface of the forward fitting of the #5 tail rotor drive shaft.

Phoenix, Arizona News Helicopters Collide Killing Eight
On July 27, 2007 KTVK-TV Channel 3 (Ch 3) and KNXS-TV Channel 15 (Ch 15) news helicopters, N613TV and N215TV, respectively, collided in mid air while maneuvering in Phoenix, Arizona.  The commercial pilots of both helicopters and one photographer in each helicopter were killed. Both news helicopters were destroyed. Channel 15 News Helicopter departed Scottsdale, Arizona, at 1222, and Channel 3 News Helicopter departed Scottsdale at 1232, as local electronic news gathering (ENG) flights. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plans had been filed.

Both news helicopters were covering a police pursuit on local streets. The suspect’s vehicle had been moving, but he stopped, abandoned it, and acquired another vehicle. The collision occurred during this transition.

The media pilots have a letter of agreement (LOA) with the air traffic control tower for Phoenix International Airport. This letter of agreement provides media pilots with standardized procedures to facilitate their movement in and out of the airspace. It also reduces the workload for the controllers.

A Safety Board air traffic control (ATC) specialist interviewed controllers in the Phoenix air traffic control tower. The air traffic manager reported that about 1223, the pilot of police helicopter “Firebird 8” contacted the PHX air traffic control tower local control north (LCN) controller. The Firebird pilot requested permission to enter the Class B airspace about 5 nautical miles (nm) north of downtown at 1,800 feet mean sea level (msl) with automatic terminal information service (ATIS) Kilo, and north clearance via Sharp Echo. The LCN reported radar contact, and cleared the pilot to proceed via Sharp Echo as requested.

At 1226:08, the pilot of Ch 15 advised that he had automatic terminal information service (ATIS) information Kilo, was at Camelback Mountain, and requested to enter the Class B airspace via Sharp Echo. The controller acknowledged radar contact, and cleared Ch 15 via Sharp Echo as requested. The pilot indicated that he was heading downtown at 1,800 feet, and intended to intercept the police chase. The tower controller acknowledged and advised that there was a firebird helicopter about 1 1/2 miles west of the Biltmore at 1,900 feet. The Ch 15 pilot reported that he had the helicopter in sight, and would proceed direct to that location. About 2 minutes later, he advised that he was talking to Firebird 8 on another frequency. The tower controller responded that another inbound helicopter was 2 miles north of his position. At 1229:03, the Ch 15 pilot advised that he was climbing to 2,000 feet to stay out of Firebird 8’s way.

About 30 seconds later, LCN cleared SKY 12 into the Class B airspace to also film the chase. The pilot of SKY 12 advised that he would climb to 2,500 feet for traffic avoidance.

Another controller relieved LCN at 1234:39. In the relief briefing, the LCN noted where Firebird 8, Ch 15, and SKY 12 were doing the police chase. Firebird 8 had been cleared in and out of the Class B airspace at his discretion. SKY 12 was the helicopter at 2,500 feet.

At 1235:29, the pilot of Newshawk 5 advised that he was inbound at 2,200 feet with the ATIS. He further stated he would like to come inbound, operate with the other helicopters, and would be talking to them. The LCN controller allowed him to enter the Class B airspace, advised that three helicopters were out there, and offered to give him the call signs. The pilot responded that he had Firebird, SKY 12, and Ch 15 in sight, and thought that Ch 3 was behind him. The LCN tower controller acknowledged.

The Channel 3 news helicopter pilot made radio contact with the LCN controller at 1236:41. Ten seconds later the pilot stated that he was on the west side of Piestewa Peak, requested Sharp Echo for the North Bravo, and was going where the other helicopters were. LCN acknowledged radar contact, and cleared him to proceed via Sharp Echo as requested. LCN pointed out that there were three helicopters on site, and Newshawk 5 was about a mile ahead him. The pilot stated that he had Newshawk in sight, and a couple of the others in sight as well.

At 1244:40, the pilot of SKYFOX 10 advised LCN that he was at Piestewa Peak, and would like to operate in the Class B airspace under Sharp Echo with the others. He stated that he had the other helicopters in sight and would be talking to them. LCN acknowledged radar contact 1 mile southwest of Piestewa Peak, and cleared the pilot in via Sharp Echo as requested. He advised the pilot that there were about five helicopters on site, and one that was just passing his nose. The pilot advised that he saw the helicopter passing in front, and was talking to the other ones.

At 1246:21, the SKYFOX 10 pilot advised that there had just been a midair collision over a park, and that two helicopters were down. About 2 minutes later, the pilot advised that Channel 15 news helicopter and the Channel 3 news helicopter were involved in the collision.

In an interview, the pilot stated that as he was entering the area, the accident helicopters were positioned a reasonable distance apart when he first noticed them. The police helicopter then broadcast that there was going to be a car jacking. He stated that as a pilot, this would indicate to him that he would have to change his position. He glanced away for a moment, and looked back to the accident helicopters while flying toward them. He noted that they had moved closer together. Shortly thereafter, they impacted. He could not say for sure the relative position of each helicopter, but noted that after the collision, Ch 3 broke into many pieces. Ch 15 remained in the air for a second, and then dove nose-first into the ground.

Ch 15 and was on the left side of Ch 3. Upon impact, witnesses said that Ch 3 broke into many pieces and fell to the ground spinning. Ch 15 remained relatively intact except for the main rotor blades. It pointed nose down and collided with the ground. There were no reports of erratic movements prior to the collision, and no unusual sounds or smoke.

Channel 3 News Helicopter Information

The pilot was 42 years old. A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that he received a private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land on December 13, 1982. He obtained a commercial pilot certificate on August 24, 1987, with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot held a certified flight instructor (CFI) certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter; he obtained his most recent certificate on April 27, 2007. The FAA reported that they had no record of accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions in their database involving this pilot.

The FAA issued the pilot a second-class medical certificate on August 8, 2006; it had no limitations or waivers.

Channel 3 News Helicopter Information
The pilot was 47 years old. A review of FAA airman records revealed that he received a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter on May 23, 1990. He obtained a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter on December 7, 1990. The FAA reported that they had no record of accidents, incidents, or enforcement actions in their database involving this pilot.

The FAA issued the pilot a second-class medical certificate on December 27, 2006. He held a Statement of Demonstrated Ability (waiver) for defective color vision.

Channel 3 & 15 News Helicopters Wreckage

The main wreckage for each helicopter was in Steele Indian School Park, and they were about 160 feet apart. The accident site elevation was 1,100 feet. The main debris field, which encompassed components from both helicopters, was about 2,160 feet long and 560 feet wide, and north of Indian School Road. The only pieces of debris south of Indian School Road were an outboard segment of the yellow main rotor blade from the Ch 3 helicopter and an outboard segment of the red main rotor blade from the Ch 15 helicopter.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Wreckage Examination

The main rotor blades for the AS350B2 rotate clockwise.

N13TV

The Ch 3 helicopter’s cabin was primarily white. The forward half of the tail boom was red. Going aft, the tail boom paint scheme transitioned to dark orange; this section included the horizontal stabilizers. Aft of the horizontal stabilizers, it transitioned to light orange; the tail rotor was attached to this section. The aft portion of the tail boom consisted of the vertical stabilizer and tail cone, which were yellow.

Airframe

Fire consumed most of the main fuselage section. The tail boom section separated into several pieces.

The section of the tail boom forward of the tail rotor comprised one section. It had clockwise crush damage. The forward right section of the right horizontal stabilizer had a camera attached, and separated in an upward direction. The aft section of the left stabilizer separated, and was north of the main wreckage. It exhibited accordion crush damage in an outward direction. Investigators observed smeared zinc chromate primer transfer in a clockwise direction on the upper center section of the tail boom and horizontal stabilizer.

The aft tail boom comprised another piece. It exhibited a crush mark on the left side that was upward and to the right.

The remainder of the tail section with the tail rotor attached comprised a third major piece. The right side of the vertical fin exhibited punctures with black rub marks. The front of this section exhibited clockwise twisting with blue-gray paint and zinc chromate primer transfer. One tail rotor exhibited a flattened strike tab with chordwise scoring and orange paint transfer on the leading edge. The airframe manufacturer’s investigator noted indications of flapping. The tail rotor drive shaft separated at the front end of this separated section; the fracture surface was angular and twisted. The tail rotor pitch change rod separated just forward of the tail rotor bell crank input along a 45-degree angle.

Main Rotor Blades

Red Blade

Charring encompassed the area 4 to 5 feet from the blade root. The blade portion aft of the spar from approximately 11 feet out was missing. The blade sustained mechanical damage and separation 14 to 15 feet from the blade root. Investigators observed blue-gray and orange paint transfer marks on the leading edge from about 12 feet out to the separation point. The end plate and weights separated; investigators recovered them several hundred feet north-northwest of the main wreckage.

Blue Blade

Investigators observed significant mechanical damage 5 feet and 11 feet from the blade root, and the blade separated at these points. The leading edge stainless steel strip was missing from 9 to 11 feet. The blade sustained thermal damage from the root out to 11 feet; there was no thermal damage on the outboard separated pieces. The end plate was intact.

Yellow Blade

The blade portion aft of the spar was missing from 4 feet 4 inches and outboard. Investigators observed mechanical damage to the leading edge 5 feet from the blade root, and the blade separated at this point. The blade sustained mechanical damage 13 to 14 feet from the root. The 9- to 13-foot area sustained thermal damage. The outer 1 1/2 feet of the blade, with the end plate attached, separated; this piece on a parking garage rooftop. It was 1,050 feet southwest of the Ch 3 main wreckage site. The outboard leading edge of this piece exhibited in excess of 90 degrees forward bending mechanical damage. The yellow Starflex blade sleeve exhibited the most severe damage of the three sleeves; it exhibited severe broomstraw damage.

Engine

Post accident examination of the CH 3 engine revealed substantial impact and post-impact fire damage. The axial compressor ruptured from the gas generator between the intermediate casing and the turbine casing assembly of the gas generator. The axial rotor appeared solidly packed with mud and debris. The axial compressor’s blades exhibited mechanical damage in the form of gouges and scratches. The nose bullet was in place, and appeared undamaged. The compressor case and combustion chamber ruptured. The linking tube appeared flattened. The short shaft separated from the triangular flange at the rear of the turbine reduction gear; it exhibited torsional twist. The short shaft exhibited rotational scarring aft of the forward attach flange. The free turbine blades were in place, and the tips of the leading edges appeared chipped and broken.

N215TV

The CH 15 helicopter was primarily dark blue along the top of the cabin, tail boom, and tail; the lower part of the cabin was yellow.

Airframe

Fire consumed most of the main wreckage.

Main Rotor Blades

Red Blade

The leading edge sustained mechanical damage 6 1/2 feet from the root; the blade separated at this point. The blade section aft of the spar was missing from the separation point to 12 feet 8 inches from the root. The leading edge stainless steel strip was also missing from this area. The outboard 2 feet 8 inches of the blade separated, and hit a delivery truck parked at 4041 North Central Avenue. This was 1,040 feet southwest of the Ch 15 main wreckage, and about 180 feet from the separated yellow blade piece from the Ch 3 helicopter. It damaged the hood of the truck, and came to rest about 10 feet away. The end plate was in place.

Blue Blade

The leading edge sustained mechanical damage and separated 4 feet 8 inches from the root. The inboard sections of the blade sustained thermal damage. Large sections of blade skin and foam core were missing. Investigators observed leading edge mechanical damage and forward bending from 9 feet 7 inches to 12 feet 10 inches. One piece from this area separated; it was inside the park boundaries about 560 feet south of the main wreckage.

Yellow Blade

The blade sustained thermal damage from the root out to 8 feet 9 inches. Investigators observed severe mechanical damage and separation from 8 feet 9 inches to 11 feet 9 inches. A section of the leading edge stainless steel strip from this area exhibited blue-gray paint transfer marks. The blade section outboard of 11 feet 9 inches separated. This piece was within the park boundaries, and about 520 feet south of the main wreckage. It did not exhibit any thermal damage; the end plate was in place.

Engine

Post accident examination of the CH 15 engine revealed substantial impact and post-crash fire damage. The axial rotor blades appeared bent in a direction opposite the direction of rotation. The nose bullet appeared flattened and smeared in a direction opposite that of rotation. The coupling tube between the engine and main rotor transmission ruptured; it exhibited torsional twist. The linking tube was twisted. The transmission shaft ruptured, and exhibited torsional twist. The short shaft separated from the triangular flange at the rear of the turbine reduction gear, and twisted; however, it remained connected to the triangular flange by a portion of the flexible coupling. The free turbine blades were in place, and appeared undamaged.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Collision Avoidance Systems

The Ch 3 helicopter had a SkyWatch traffic advisory system on board. The system provided audio warning and displayed targets on the helicopter’s Garmin 430 navigation unit. The Ch 3 chief pilot stated that turning the system on was part of the power-up checklist and that the system worked when he flew the helicopter earlier on the day of the accident. The Ch 15 helicopter did not have a traffic advisory and collision avoidance system aboard.

Post Accident Meeting with Phoenix ENG Pilots

The ENG pilots for the Phoenix area met with investigators regarding the midair collision. The group reported that they were a close-nit community, and were in communication daily. All pilots except for Ch 15 operated out of the same hangar; Ch 15 operated out of a nearby hangar.

The pilots indicated that when they receive a call of an event, the helicopter(s) is dispatched. The first pilot to arrive on scene establishes a position. All aircraft are on the same discreet air-to-air frequency (123.025), which law enforcement also monitors. As additional pilots enter the area, the pilots transmit their altitudes and positions to each other. If someone is going to change position, they transmit how and where they are changing. In the case of the accident flight, the other news pilots flying believed that the communication was adequate between the two accident pilots. In addition to the common air-to-air frequency, pilots also maintain radio contact (via separate frequencies) with the tower, their station, and their other crewmembers over an intercom. When pilots are broadcasting live, they advise the other pilots on the local frequency, and depending on the length of the broadcast, will also notify the tower. During the broadcast, the pilot continues to monitor the common frequencies.

Except for Channel 12, all operators use a combination pilot/reporter. Channel 12 uses a photographer/reporter. All helicopters are equipped with a photographer, who operates the camera; the pilot has visual access to a monitor that is mounted near the instrument panel.

During missions involving the police helicopter, the media helicopters remain 500 feet above it. There is constant chatter on the discreet frequency regarding positions. There are times when a pilot will lose sight of another helicopter over the city, because the helicopter blends into the ground clutter making it difficult to discern.

Safety Suggestions

The pilots suggested the following safety improvements:

1. High visibility main rotor and tail rotor blades
2. LED anti-collision strobe lights
3. Improved position lights
4. Quarterly meetings
5. Helicopter Association International (HAI) support

Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)

FAR 91.111 addresses operating near other aircraft. It states in part that no person may operate an aircraft so close to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard. FAR 91.113 states in part that vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.

Advisory Circular (AC) 90-48C Pilots’ Role in Collision Avoidance

According to AC 90-48C, “…the flight rules prescribed in Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) set forth the concept of “See and Avoid.” This concept requires that vigilance shall be maintained at all times, by each person operating an aircraft, regardless of whether the operation is conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) or Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

“Pilots should also keep in mind their responsibility for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Remember that most NMAC [mid-air collision] accidents and reported MAC [near mid-air collisions] occur during good VFR weather conditions and during the hours of daylight.”

The AC further states, “pilots should remain constantly alert to all traffic movement within their field of vision as well as periodically scan the entire visual field outside of their aircraft to ensure detection of conflicting traffic. The probability of spotting a potential collision threat increases with the time spent looking outside, but certain techniques may be used to increase the effectiveness of the scan time. The human eyes tend to focus somewhere, even in a featureless sky. In order to be most effective, the pilot should shift glances and refocus at intervals. Pilots should also realize that their eyes may require several seconds to refocus when switching views between items in the cockpit and distance objects. Peripheral vision can be most useful in spotting collision threats from other aircraft. Pilots are reminded of the requirements to move one’s head in order to search around the physical obstructions, such as door and window posts.”News Helicopter Crash occurred July 27, 2007 in Phoenix, AZ

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

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Fire Fighting Helicopter Crash Kills One

The accident occurred while the helicopter was supporting firefighting efforts with long-line operations. Two days prior to the accident, the division group supervisor (DIVS) anchored a colored reflective panel used for indicating landing and drop zones at the accident location. The DIVS stated that no site assessment was performed at the time of the panel placement because the placement was not intended to be the indicator of the drop zone for blivet deliveries. The terrain in the area consisted of steep slopes and trees varying in height from 75 to 200 feet.

One day prior to the accident, the location of the panel was not changed from the previous day and remained as placed by the DIVS. The accident helicopter, equipped with a 150-foot-long line, then made the blivet drop within 3 feet of the panel. The marshaller stated he warned the pilot about the proximity of one tree that was located to the right and upslope. Two ground crew members distanced themselves from the blivet drop because they were concerned with their own safety due to the tree hazards.

The division safety officer visited the site immediately after the blivet operation and there was no discussion regarding the aircraft use, the drop zone, or any discernment on the part of any crew member regarding the safety of the operation. In addition, there was no discussion about the operation during the “After-Action Review” (AAR) at the overnight camp that evening. On the day of the accident prior to the day’s missions, there was no safety assessment or organized AAR conducted.

The accident pilot was told that he would be delivering two more blivets to the same drop zone and back hauling the empty blivets that had been delivered the day before. At the intended drop zone, two crew members, who were not the same from the previous day, were so concerned about the potential for an accident that they briefed each other three times on what action would be taken in the event of an accident; however, this was not discussed with the pilot. The panel was not moved and the drop zone site remained in the same location as the previous day.

 The marshaller communicated with the DIVS that a longer long-line was recommended so the helicopter could remain above the trees; however, the helicopter had already departed. Witnesses observed that as the blivets were set down on the ground, the helicopter drifted to the right and the main rotor blades contacted a 165-foot-tall tree about 15 feet from the top. The long-line, along with the blivets, remained attached to the helicopter as it made a turn to the left, stopped momentarily, and then flew downhill to ground impact.

The helicopter impacted several trees and was destroyed by post impact fire. No anomalies were noted with the airframe and engine that would have precluded normal operation prior to the accident. The helicopter was approved for the pilot to operate the aircraft from the left seat. Visibility to the right side of the helicopter was partially obstructed by aircraft structure, passenger seats, and the seat headrests.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause(s) of this accident due to the pilot’s failure to maintain clearance with the trees during a long-line operation. Other contributing factors was the Forest Service’s inadequate communication between crews, failure to properly assess the safety of the intended drop zone, reduced visibility to the right side of the helicopter, and the trees.

Firefighting Helicopter Crash – July 23, 2007 in Happy Camp, CA

Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

If you have been injured or a loved one has been killed in a helicopter crash, then call us 24/7 for an immediate consultation to discuss the details of the accident and learn what we can do to help protect your legal rights. Whether the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the helicopter owner, hospital or corporation, the manufacturer or due to lack of training, poor maintenance, pilot or operator error, tail rotor failure, sudden loss of power, defective electronics or engine failure or flying in bad weather conditions, we can investigate the case and provide you the answers you need. Call Toll Free 1-800-883-9858 and talk to a Board Certified Trial Lawyer with over 30 years of legal experience or fill out our online form by clicking below:

Legal Help: Contact a Helicopter Lawyer

Hughes 369A Helicopter Crashes in National Forest

On May 13, 2007 a Hughes 369A, N468WE, registered to and operated by an individual, impacted into the Bankhead National Forest near Moulton, Alabama. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The commercial-rated pilot received fatal injuries and the helicopter was destroyed. The flight originated from the Merkel Field Sylacauga Municipal Airport, Sylacauga, Alabama, earlier that day, about 1645.

Information obtained from family members and local authorities revealed the pilot just purchased the helicopter from a private individual through a broker in Lakeland, Florida. The pilot was flying the helicopter back to Kansas, where he resided. On May 13, about 1645, he departed from Sylacauga, from one of his planned fuel stops. His route of flight took him over the area of Moulton, which at that time he canceled the flight plan through the Birmingham Air Traffic Control facility and continued on visual flight rules. Moments later the helicopter was lost from Air Traffic Control radar. The last radar hit was at 1729, with the coordinates of latitude north 34: 20: 43 and longitude west 87: 16: 13. No distress calls were received prior to the loss of radar contact.

On May 15 at 1130 CDT, the helicopter wreckage was located in the Bankhead National Forest by the local authorities, which were searching for the helicopter after it was lost from radar. The search efforts were hindered due to the fires in the forest, believed to be as a result from the helicopter crash. The main wreckage was located in the bottom of a crater, with the coordinates of latitude north 34: 19: 23 and longitude west 87: 15: 17. The damage to the surrounding trees indicated the helicopter descended in a near vertical, with minimal forward, direction on a heading of 350 degrees before impacting the ground and the base of a large tree. Key flight components, which separated from the helicopter, were located near the vicinity of the main wreckage; along the route of flight. Those components have been retained by NTSB for metallurgical examination.

NTSB Investigation has not been concluded at the time of this entry.